Illustration: a scan film, in point clouds, of the places an energy or water business runs: a wind farm on a ridge, a grid control room, a substation at night, a solar park, a water pumping station, a gas pipeline at dusk and the Cantic mark. The labels show synthetic readings and addresses.

Power gridsRenewablesGasWater

We break into your control room before a criminal does.

Through your contractors’ remote access to the machines behind your sites. With Fortify, we write the fix within 24 hours.

Energy and utilities

Every remote site is a way in.

Every line to the internet is a door.

Eclipse, our own model trained to attack, keeps going until it can prove full control.

In plain words: an attacker that works for your company.

How far Eclipse goes

  • Website
  • Apps
  • Email
  • Logins
  • Cloud
  • Servers
  • Internal network
  • Machines

What your business runs on

We know what your sites run on. So do criminals.

Outside firms

  • Your IT provider
  • Control systems integrator
  • Wind and solar maintenance
  • Telemetry provider
  • Equipment makers’ support

Remote access

  • VPN
  • Remote desktop
  • Vendor portals
  • 4G routers
  • Remote support
  • Control room

    • SCADA servers
    • Operator screens
    • Data historian
    • Alarms
  • Substation

    • Protection relays
    • Remote terminal units
    • Communications gateway
  • Wind and solar farm

    • Turbine controllers
    • Solar inverters
    • Remote monitoring portal
  • Water and pumping

    • Pump controllers
    • Chemical dosing
    • Level and flow sensors
    • Telemetry outstations
  • Office

    • Customer portal
    • Billing
    • Email
    • ERP
    • Backups

Real attack

Attacks that reached power and water.

See every attack we track

  1. Spain

    Endesa Energía, an electricity and gas supplier

    An attacker may have copied customers’ contact, ID and contract data, the company said.

    Sources Endesa ARA

  2. Poland

    More than 30 wind and solar farms, and a heat and power plant

    Attackers damaged controllers and deleted files; the farms lost remote control, but production went on.

    Sources CERT Polska Help Net Security

  3. Mataró, Catalonia, Spain

    Aigües de Mataró, a municipal water company

    Corporate systems hit and customer data possibly exposed; the water supply kept running, it said.

    Sources The Record (Recorded Future News) Escudo Digital Ara

Compared

This is not a yearly pentest.

A normal pentestCantic
Once a yearDay and night, and on every change
A PDF weeks laterProof as it happens, with a replay
Stops at the websiteFrom the website to the server and the machine
You work out the fixWe write the fix within 24 hours
You hope it holdsWe attack again to check it holds

Under your control

Inside the rules you sign.

Guardrails and data privacy for power, water and the sites behind them.

Nothing runs until you sign

An authorisation and rules of engagement, signed by someone entitled to authorise the test.

Inside the limits you set

Your scope, hours and limits. It stops once it can prove control.

Stop it within 60 seconds

Rate-limited and time-boxed, so your systems do not slow down.

Every action on the record

Hashed and timestamped in a ledger you can inspect, and followed live.

A person on every critical finding

A named lead on our team.

No outside AI company sees your data

Eclipse is our own model, on our own servers.

Destroyed when the work is done

Deleted in several steps on our side; we do not keep it. First test reports: 14 days unless you subscribe.

Your IT provider gets the fix

Findings and fixes go to your own team or your IT provider.

Regulation

The rules an energy or water company answers to.

  • NIS2 covers energy and water companies with 50 or more staff, or over €10 million in both turnover and balance sheet (Annex I). 1
  • They must manage supply chain security and warn of a significant incident within 24 hours (Articles 21 and 23). 1
  • In Spain, designated essential operators report incidents that could significantly disrupt the service through their CSIRT (Real Decreto-ley 12/2018). 2

Questions

What buyers ask us

And the systems that run our sites?
If a contractor’s login or an open page leads to your control systems, Eclipse tries it.
Does it help with NIS2?
Yes: every step is recorded, from the signed scope to the retest, but it does not certify compliance.
An integrator already looks after our control systems. Why you?
Your integrator and IT provider run your systems and we attack them: two different jobs.

How it starts

Your results in one day.

Compare plans
  1. You sign the rules

    An authorisation and rules of engagement, signed before anything runs.

  2. Eclipse tests what is in scope

    From the outside, the way an attacker would. There is nothing to install.

  3. We put the findings on the table

    In plain words, with what to do. Every finding comes with proof.

See what a criminal would see.

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